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1. Introduction
Over the last 20 years, the stock market has discounted diversified firms.
1 At the same time,
many diversified firms have become more focused by divesting assets.
2 Some firms become more
focused by divesting an asset in an industry that is unrelated to their core industry and other firms
divest assets in their core industry. Studies by John and Ofek (1995) and  Daley,  Mehrota and
Sivakumar (1997), among others, show that shareholders gain when firms become more focused
by divesting non-core assets but not when they divest core assets. Divesting a major asset is one
of the most important decisions that the internal capital market of diversified firms makes.
Despite these studies, however, we have only limited knowledge about why firms choose to
divest a particular asset and how the characteristics of the asset divested affect shareholder
wealth. We investigate these issues using a sample of 168 firms that focus by divesting one or
more segments over the 1978-94 period.
Our sample enables us to evaluate the economic importance of three possible
explanations for focusing. Each has implications for the segments that firms divest:
1) The portfolio model of focusing. A firm could focus simply because it has one or
several segments that could be better managed outside the firm. With this view of the
diversified firm, managers pick winners and divest losers as if they were portfolio
managers.
3 The portfolio model implies that a segment is divested if it  underperforms its
industry and does not have offsetting synergies. If unrelated diversification has fewer
synergies than related diversification, this model predicts that for a given level of
                                                   
1 See Lang and Stulz (1994), Berger and Ofek (1995), and Servaes (1996) for estimates of the
diversification discount.
2 See  Liebeskind and  Opler (1992) for evidence.
3 See Stein (1997) for a model where the management of a diversified firm picks winners. Note that a
segment could be valuable to the firm at a point in time and cease to be so later. For a model of
diversification and divestitures that emphasizes this, see  Matsusaka (1997). Kaplan and  Weisbach (1992)
consider divestitures of acquisitions.  Weisbach (1995) points out that divestitures are more likely as
management changes.2
segment performance relative to its industry, a segment unrelated to the core activities of
the firm is more likely to be divested.
2) The financing hypothesis of focusing. Lang, Poulsen and Stulz (1994) present a
financing hypothesis of asset sales. They emphasize that management values firm size
and  is reluctant to sell assets. It does so only when management cannot pursue its goals
without raising funds and alternate financing sources are too expensive. With the
financing hypothesis, divesting firms are financially constrained. Because of  illiquidity in
the market for corporate assets, firms may fail in divesting assets. As emphasized by
Shleifer and Vishny (1992), liquidity in the market for corporate assets falls with asset
size. Consequently, firms are more likely to succeed in divesting small segments. Further,
they want divestitures to generate cash or, if they cannot divest segments to generate
cash, they want to divest those segments that have large cash requirements because they
require significant investment. While  Lang,  Poulsen, and Stulz (1994) do not address
internal capital markets explicitly, the view that management values benefits from control
and that these benefits increase with firm size implies that firms are more likely to divest
unrelated segments for two reasons.   First, managers acquire unrelated segments when the
alternative use of cash flow generated by core activities is to return it to the firm's
owners. When the firm faces financial constraints, management has a better use for the
cash parked in unrelated segments, so that unrelated segments are the first ones converted
into cash when the firm has to divest segments. Second, management wants to protect its
position. The Shleifer and Vishny (1989) model of managerial entrenchment predicts that
management wants to remain associated with the segments whose value depends more on
management’s specific capital.
4  These segments are the core segments.
                                                   
4 Boot (1992) can also be viewed as predicting that small segments are more likely to be divested. In his
model, managers are reluctant to divest assets because doing so is viewed as evidence that they failed. The
adverse impact on reputation of selling an asset should be inversely related to its size to the extent that if  a
divestiture is interpreted by the market as a managerial failure, failure on a smaller scale is less damaging to
management's reputation.3
3) The inefficient internal capital markets hypothesis of focusing. Recent papers have
argued theoretically and empirically that internal capital market inefficiencies contribute
to the diversification discount.  Lamont (1997) and Shin and Stulz (1998) show that a
segment's investment can fall because of poor performance of the firm even though the
segment's investment opportunities are unchanged. They show further that as a firm
contracts investment because of poor performance, it does so with little regard for the
investment opportunities of segments. Meyer,  Milgrom, and Roberts (1992) develop a
model of asset sales where having poorly performing segments is costly because of rent-
seeking activities. Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (1999) show that diversity in investment
opportunities is costly. Scharfstein and Stein (1999) argue that internal capital markets
inefficiencies lead to  overinvestment in small segments. Scharfstein (1997) provides
evidence supportive of this. If firms focus because doing so reduces internal capital
markets inefficiencies, these models would imply that focusing firms have greater
diversity of investment opportunities and greater  overinvestment in small segments than
diversified firms that do not focus.
It is important to note that these three possible explanations for why firms focus and what
determines the choice of assets to be divested are not mutually exclusive. For instance, a firm's
internal capital markets could be so inefficient as to make it financially constrained and lead it to
invest in industries where it does not have a comparative advantage. We are more interested in
the relative importance of each hypothesis in the focusing decision. When we investigate which
firms focus and which segments get divested, we find little evidence in support of the portfolio
model of focusing, strong evidence in favor of the financing hypothesis of focusing, and almost
no evidence supporting the inefficient internal capital market hypothesis of focusing. Our analysis
of the stock-price reaction to divestitures is supportive of this conclusion. Contrary to the
inefficient internal capital markets hypothesis, we find that firms do not divest segments in a way
that reduces the diversity of investment opportunities the most, that the divested segments do not4
overinvest, and that firms with greater diversity of investment opportunities are not more likely to
focus. In support of the financing hypothesis, we show that the firms in our sample are firms that
invest substantially less and have significantly lower cash flow  than comparable diversified firms
that do not focus. The probability that a core segment is divested is about one third less than the
probability that a non-core segment is divested. Firms in our sample are more likely to divest
segments with poor cash flow performance. However, the portfolio model of focusing predicts
that firms divest segments because they perform poorly relative to their industry. This does not
seem to be the case. In our sample, the level of a segment’s cash flow, not its cash flow relative to
its industry appears to be important.
Strikingly, the segment most likely to be divested is the smallest segment of the firm. A
segment's size relative to the size of its firm explains two and a half times as much of the
divestiture decision as does its performance or whether it is a segment unrelated to the core
activities of the firm. In 66 out of 127 divested segments (representing 106 firms), the smallest
segment is divested. In contrast, only seven firms divest the largest segment. In 21 firms, the
largest segment is the segment with the worst cash flow performance. Yet, only one of these 21
segments is divested which seems strongly inconsistent with the portfolio model of focusing. In
27 firms, the smallest segment is the best performing segment in the firm, yet more than half of
these 27 segments are divested. Since only 48 divested segments out of 127 (representing 106
firms) have the worst performance within the firm, the probability that the  worst-performing
segment is divested is almost a third less than the probability that the smallest segment is
divested.
We view our evidence  on the role of a segment's relative size in the divestiture decision as
strongly supportive of the financing hypothesis. With that hypothesis, firms divest assets to relax
financing constraints. The market for corporate assets determines which segments a firm ends up
divesting because the firm has to relax these constraints in the short run. Because of the inverse
relation between segment size and liquidity, firms are more likely to divest smaller segments. The
liquidity of asset markets is less relevant for the other two hypotheses. With the portfolio model5
of focusing, a firm will divest a segment when the present value of its cash flows is higher outside
the firm than inside. The liquidity of the market for an asset only affects the timing of the sale,
but the firm can wait if the market for the asset it wants to sell lacks liquidity. The same reasoning
applies for the inefficient internal capital markets model of focusing.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, after introducing our sample, we investigate how
segments divested differ from segments retained. In section 3, we compare the firms in our
sample to other firms that do not divest. In section 4, we study the determinants of the stock-price
reaction to the segment divestiture announcement. Section 5 concludes.
2. A comparison of divested and retained segments
2.1. The sample
To investigate how firms focus, we start with a sample of firms that decrease the number of
reported industry segments in the period 1978-1994. SFAS No. 14 requires that firms report
information for segments that represent 10 percent or more of consolidated sales for fiscal years
ending after December 15, 1977. The Business Information file of Compustat collects this
information. We use the Compustat Full-Coverage Industry Segment File (CISF) database, which
includes the Research Tapes, to identify these firms.
5 We exclude firms that have either a
Compustat SIC or an Industry Segment Identification code (SID) between 6000 and 6999
(Financial Services Industry), 4900 and 4999 (Regulated Utilities).  We also  exclude  American
Depository Receipts.
We want to consider firms that focused in an economically significant way and we want these
firms to be large to insure that the data we need is available consistently. We therefore include
only firms that have total assets in excess of $100 million. We further only consider firms that
decrease the number of segments for the first time. As reported by  Hyland (1997), firms
sometimes change their number of segments without changing their activities. We therefore
                                                   
5 The Full-Coverage File consists of all  companies which file 10-K’s with the Securities and Exchange
Commission.6
investigate each firm using LEXIS NEXIS to make sure that the decrease in the number of
segments corresponds to an actual transaction where a segment is divested.
6    We ignore all firms
that decrease the number of segments but where no transaction can be identified. This avoids
firms with reporting changes rather than focusing changes. A case where the firm decides to
consolidate the reporting of two segments into one results in a decrease in the number of
segments for a firm but does not correspond to an increase in focus for that firm. These criteria
result in an initial sample of 168 firms with total assets in excess of $100 million. The 168 firms
constitute 208 divested and 466 retained segments.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on the final sample of 168 firms. The distribution of
focusing years,  t, is shown in panel A of Table 1. The highest number of focusing events occurred
in 1981 with 21 cases.  Three years  (1990, 1992, 1994) tie for the lowest number of focusing
events (5 cases). Except for the concentration of events in the early and mid-eighties, the events
are generally uniformly distributed over the sample period.
Panel B of Table 1 reports the decrease in the number of segments in year (0) relative to year
(-1). In our sample, 142 firms decreased the number of segments by one, 22 firms by  two, and
four firms by three segments. The Herfindahl index based on sales is often used as a measure of
the degree of diversification of a firm. Panel C shows the distribution of the change in the sales-
based Herfindahl index (see the appendix for the computation procedure) for years (-1) and year
(0). In the year before divestiture, the majority of firms (67 percent) have a change in the
Herfindahl index of less than five percent in absolute value. In the focusing year, more than 100
firms have an increase in the Herfindahl index of at least 15 percent.
2.2. Univariate comparison of segments divested with segments retained
We first consider whether the divested segments are related (core segments) or unrelated
(non-core segments) to the firm’s core activities. We then investigate how the size, performance,
and investment policies of divested segments compare to their retained counterparts.
                                                   
6 In L EXIS   NEXIS    the following sources are used: PR Newswire, The Financial Times, Reuters Financial
Service, The New York Times, The Chicago Tribune, Business Wire, and The Wall Street Journal.7
2.2.1. Core versus non-core segments
The financing hypothesis predicts that firms are more likely to divest small non-core
segments. The portfolio model of focusing predicts that given a segment's industry-adjusted cash
flow, a non-core segment is more likely to be divested. The inefficient capital markets model of
focusing predicts that segments that contribute more to capital market inefficiencies are more
likely to be divested. One would expect a higher probability for such segments to be unrelated
segments. Further, whether a firm divests a core asset or non-core asset has received a great deal
of attention in the literature. We therefore provide evidence on this issue first. Panel A of Table 2
reports the industry breakdown for the sample based on the firm’s overall 2-digit Compustat SIC.
Using SIC codes makes it possible to assess relatedness only to a limited extent. This is because
SIC codes do not make it possible to observe vertical integration. Nevertheless, the evidence we
uncover is instructive. The majority of firms (78 percent) are in the manufacturing industry (2-
digit SIC range 20-39). To judge the importance of the sale of non-core segments, we compare
the SIC code for both the parent firm and the segment being divested. Panel B shows the results
for seven broad industrial classifications. Numbers in parentheses along the diagonal represent
cases where the divested segment has the same category as that of its parent. The majority of
segments divested have parent firms in manufacturing. In fact, 124 of the 208 segments in our
sample involve manufacturing firms divesting a manufacturing segment. Additional details on the
manufacturing portion of the sample are provided in panel C. Panel D reveals that at the 2-digit
level there are 53 divested segments that are in the parent's primary 2-digit classification.  In 24
cases the parent and divested segment share the same 3-digit SIC. There are 18 cases where the
divested segment has the same  4-digit SIC as the parent's primary classification. The results
reveal that 69.7 percent of the divestitures in our sample involve firms spinning off segments
outside their primary 2-digit SIC classification. For comparison, panel E reports the industrial
classification of the remaining segments in comparison to the parent's primary SIC code. At each
level of industrial classification, firms are more likely to be retaining core segments than non-core8
segments. A useful way to look at this data is the following. A core segment has a probability of
0.23 to be divested; in contrast, a non-core segment has a probability of 0.36 to be divested. In
other words, a non-core segment has a probability of being divested which is about one half
higher than a core segment.
2.2.2. Segment financial characteristics and size
Our analysis now shifts to a comparison of the financial characteristics of divested and
retained segments. We obtain from the CISF database the following data items for segments: (a)
sales, (b) operating profits, (c) depreciation, depletion and amortization, (d) capital expenditures,
and (e) identifiable assets. For comparisons to be meaningful, we have to make sure that the
characteristics of the segments do not change over the analysis period. Since we want to compare
both growth and level variables before the year of the sale, we need to restrict our sample to firms
where the composition of the retained and divested segments has not changed during the three
years prior to the sale. In the following, we always consider variables in year (-1), the year before
the divestiture, and normalize them by sales in year (-2). Alternate  normalizations do not affect
our results. This reduces the sample from the 168 firms that match on Compustat to 106  firms,
representing 419 segments, of which 127 are divested and 292 retained in the year of the
divestiture.
Remember that the portfolio model of focusing discussed earlier implies that the firm sells
segments that perform poorly relative to their industry. Therefore, we first investigate how
divested and retained segments compare to their industry. Table 3 provides this evidence.
Throughout the table, a segment's industry is defined by its two-digit SIC code. As is common
with accounting data, we focus our discussion on the medians. The segments retained have
significantly higher cash flow to sales than their industry. In contrast, the industry-adjusted cash
flow performance of segments divested is negative and significantly lower than for the segments
retained. This evidence is consistent with the simple focusing model. At the same time, however,
it has to be interpreted carefully. It is difficult to distinguish whether a firm pays attention to the
cash flow of a segment or to its cash flow relative to its industry because the two variables are9
highly correlated.  We will return to this issue later. Finally, our evidence has an important
implication for the impact of focusing on corporate performance. Given our evidence, aggregate
firm performance improves as the firm focuses, but this is because the firm that focuses retains
the better performing segments.  It does not provide evidence that focusing makes existing
activities more efficient. Based on our evidence, it therefore seems difficult to evaluate the impact
of focusing on corporate performance without evaluating the performance of individual segments.
Table 3 also provides interesting evidence on capital expenditures. Divested segments invest
less than their industry and less than retained segments, but retained segments invest less than
their industry as well. Therefore, this table does not support the view that diversified firms that
focus have been  overinvesting in the divested segments or in general. However, the fact that
divesting firms invest less than the median firm in their industry is consistent with firms acting as
if they have limited resources. Strikingly, the focusing firms invest less in divested segments
compared to their industry relative to amounts invested in retained segments. Not only do
divested segments invest less than their industry, but their capital expenditures are also growing
less than those of their industry . Table 3 provides evidence of an important difference in size
between segments retained and segments divested. The segments of diversified firms are
significantly larger  than the median firm in the industry. However, segments retained are
significantly larger relative to their industry than the segments divested.
While the portfolio model of focusing emphasizes the importance of industry-adjusted
segment characteristics, the financing hypothesis stresses the segment characteristics that
determine how a segment affects the firm's financial resources. With the financing hypothesis, a
firm will value more a segment that has high cash flow but  underperforms its industry than a
segment that has low cash flow but outperforms its industry. Consequently, we also have to
consider segment characteristics that are not industry-adjusted. These data are provided in Table
4. We find clear evidence in Table 4 that divested segments are significantly smaller than retained
segments. This is true whether we use sales or assets and whether we look at the year before the
divestiture or two years before the divestiture. The sales of the divested segment relative to the10
sales of all segments are not shrinking over time, indicating that the divested segment is not
shrinking within the firm before it is divested.
As expected given our discussion of industry-adjusted segment cash flows, segments sold
have significantly lower cash flow than segments kept. This is true for the year before the
divestiture as well as two years before the divestiture. In an effort to understand the investment
opportunity set for the divested and non-divested segments, we also calculate the median Tobin’s
q for their industries.
7 The industry  qs of the divested segments are not significantly different
from the industry  qs of the retained segments. Remember, however, that about a fifth of our
sample involves divesting segments in the same 2-digit industry as the parent. When we look at
divested segments that are not related to the firm’s core, we find that  q’s are significantly lower
for retained segments.
Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (1999) argue that diversity in investment opportunities is
costly. A measure of diversity in investment opportunities that they use is a weighted coefficient
of variation of segment  qs (see the appendix for the computation details). The internal capital
markets inefficiencies hypothesis of focusing predicts that firms would divest segments that
contribute the most to their diversity of investment opportunities. To test this, we compute the
impact of the divestiture of any segment on their measure of diversity. Table 4 shows that the
firm's choice of segment divested does not decrease diversity significantly more than if it had
divested the retained segment with the median impact of diversity.
Although we do not report the results in tables, we evaluated the characteristics of divested
segments for  subsamples of core and non-core segments. We do not find support for the
prediction of the portfolio model of focusing that divested non-core segments have higher
industry-adjusted cash flow than core segments. In our sample, there is no significant difference
between the mean  or median of industry-adjusted cash flows for core and non-core divestitures.
The mean industry-adjusted cash flow of divested non-core segments is lower than for divested
                                                   
7 The Tobin's q is computed as the ratio of the book value of assets plus the market value  of equity minus
the book value of equity to the book value of assets.11
core segments and significantly negative, but the medians are about the same. Surprisingly, the
divested non-core segments have significantly lower lagged sales growth than the core segments
divested. Combined with our evidence that non-core segments have lower  q's, this is consistent
with the view that firms divest segments that have poorer growth opportunities.
In a variation of the portfolio model of focusing, it could be that firms divest the  worst
performing segment within the firm irrespective of whether this segment  underperforms its
industry. This could be viewed as an incentive model of divestitures. Table 5 looks at within-firm
rankings of segments divested. We present both raw and industry-adjusted rankings. For each
firm we calculate the rank of the divested segment with respect to the measure used. With size,
for example, we rank all segments within a firm according to their sales and find the rank of the
divested segment. We do the same for cash flow to sales, the segment’s q,  the ratio of capital
expenditures to total assets, and the growth of capital expenditures.
Our results indicate that firms almost never divest the largest segment. This means that
headquarters management always chooses to keep the largest segment for itself. For the whole
sample, we have only seven cases where the firm divests the segment with the largest sales. In
contrast, firms are less reluctant to sell the best performing segment. We have 21 (19) divestitures
of segments that have the best cash flow (industry-adjusted) performance within the firm. Less
than half the firms divest their worst performing segment, since in 48 of 105 firms, the segment
with the lowest cash flow to sales ratio within the firm is divested and in 49 of 105 firms the
segment with the lowest industry-adjusted cash flow within the firm is divested. Looking at the
ranks of segments divested for  q, capital expenditures and capital expenditure growth panels, it is
quite clear that segments with better investment opportunities are not protected from divestiture.
2.3. Multivariate analysis of divested and retained segments
The analysis so far shows that the larger core segments are more likely to be retained. Cash
flow is also negatively correlated with divestiture, but it does not appear as important. We now
refine our analysis to take into account the potential  correlations among segment characteristics.12
To do that, we investigate multivariate regressions where we attempt to understand which
characteristics make it more likely that a segment is divested. Remember that the portfolio model
of focusing predicts that lower industry-adjusted performance makes it more likely that a segment
is divested. The financing hypothesis predicts that firms divest segments with poor cash flow and
requiring high capital expenditures. The internal capital market  inefficiencies theory of focusing
predicts that firms divest the segments that contribute the most to the diversity of their investment
opportunities.
Table 6 reports the results of logistic regressions. Our dependent variable is a dichotomous
variable, which takes on a value of one for a divested division and zero otherwise.  For each
logistic regression, the table reports coefficients,  p-values, and marginal coefficients (slopes),
evaluated at the mean. Unless otherwise specified, cash flows and capital expenditures are
measured at the segment level in year -1 and deflated using sales of the segment in year -2.
Sensitivity tests using assets to normalize cash flows and capital expenditures produce similar
results.
Regression (1) shows the impact of segment cash flow, relative size, and capital expenditures
on the probability of segment divestiture. The probability of divestiture is negatively related to
the segment’s cash flow and its relative size. A non-core segment is more likely to be divested.
In separate regressions not reproduced here, we find that a segment's probability of divestiture is
significantly related to its cash flow and relative size. Surprisingly, the pseudo-r-square is 3.0
percent for the regression with cash flow, 4.1 percent for the regression with industry-adjusted
cash flow, and 11.9 percent for the regression with relative size. Interestingly, whether a segment
is a core segment or not does  not explain much either, since the pseudo-r-square of a regression
with only a dummy variable for whether a segment is core segment or not is 4.9 percent. A
regression with relative segment size and this relatedness dummy variable has a pseudo-r-square
of 12.6 percent, which is only slightly higher than the regression with segment relative size alone.
This indicates that a segment's relative size is a more important determinant of the divestiture
decision than its performance or whether it is a core segment or not.13
Regression (2) adds the change in the Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (1999) diversity
measure; it does not contribute to the probability that the segment will be divested. Regression (3)
reveals that the segment’s investment opportunities as measured by Tobin’s q do not matter;
whether a segment is a core segment or not affects the probability of divestiture significantly after
controlling for segment growth opportunities.
We next control for industry performance and investment. We would like to know whether
performance relative to the industry affects the probability of divestiture. If industry-adjusted
cash flow matters, we expect that if we add the industry’s median cash flow to sales, it would
have a positive significant coefficient. This would imply that it becomes more likely that a
segment will be sold as its industry performs better. The same argument applies for investment.
In regression (4), we find that the industry cash flow has an insignificant positive coefficient in
contrast to segment cash flow, which retains its significant negative coefficient. This suggests that
it is raw cash flow and not industry-adjusted cash flow that is important. To the extent that
industries where investment is high are industries with good investment opportunities, the
positive coefficient for industry capital expenditures suggests that good investment opportunities
make a divestiture more likely rather than less likely.
3. Comparison of focusing firms to firms that do not focus
Section 2 shows that segment size matters more than segment performance for the divestiture
decision, which we view as inconsistent with the portfolio model of focusing but consistent with
the financing hypothesis. We also saw that the segments of focusing firms invest less than their
industry and that this is even more so for the divested segments. Consequently, if internal capital
market inefficiencies lead to  overinvestment, these inefficiencies cannot explain why firms focus.
Our evidence does not imply, however, that  overinvestment is not a problem for diversified firms
in general; rather, it shows that this is not the problem that focusing firms attempt to resolve. It
does suggest, however, that firms that focus face financial constraints that prevent them from
investing as much as the competitors of segments. Our evidence is therefore supportive of the14
financing hypothesis. It does not follow from this that the divestitures will all take place for cash
since divesting any segment that consumes firm resources relaxes the firm's financial constraints.
In some cases, a firm might not be able to divest a segment for cash at an acceptable price and
hence resorts to the solution of spinning off the segment without receiving cash.  This would still
eliminate the demands of that segment on the firm's resources. Nevertheless, we find that 96 of
133 non-core divestitures generate a cash inflow and 19 of 31 core divestitures do so as well.
Overall, the probability that a firm gets  a cash inflow from divesting a segment is 0.7.
To find out whether focusing firms face capital constraints, we have to compare firms in our
sample to firms that have the same number of segments, are of similar size, and do not divest
segments during the sample year.  To find these comparison firms, we construct a portfolio
consisting of a minimum of five firms in the same annual sales  decile
8 as the focusing firm, with
the same number of segments as the sample firm in year (-1), and require that the comparison
firms did not divest segments during year (0). We report results using the mean value of each
variable from firms in the matching portfolio, but obtain similar results when we use the median
value. For this comparison, we start with the 168 firms for which the necessary Compustat data is
available and compare as many sample and benchmark pairs as the data permit. Table 7 reports
both means and medians. When we focus on  pairwise median differences, we find that the selling
firms’ assets, sales, and cash flow grow less than the firms that do not focus . Further, focusing
firms have a lower cash flow to sales, lower  q, and a lower coverage ratio than the comparison
firms. This evidence shows that the divesting firms perform  less well than firms that do not
divest.
The evidence of Table 7 is generally supportive of the view that firms focus because of
financial and external pressures. One obvious source of outside pressure for the firms in our
sample is that they are very poor diversifiers. Using the diversification discount computed by
Berger and Ofek (1995), we find that the focusing firms in our sample have an extremely large
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diversification discount. The diversification discount of the firms that focus is large relative to
both our comparison firms and to the sample average in the Berger and Ofek (1995) study, which
is approximately 10 percent. Such a diversification discount could be expected to bring pressure
on management from investors and from the market for corporate control. At the same time,
however, we find that only slightly more than half of the focusing firms reduce their discount
over the three years surrounding the divestiture and that neither the mean discount nor the median
discount changes significantly over that period for the focusing firms. In other words, using the
diversification discount as a yardstick, there is no clear evidence that firms that divest become
more successful diversifiers. Since we choose comparison firms based on having the same
number of segments as the focusing firms, it is perhaps only mildly surprising that the focusing
firms do not have significantly greater diversity in investment opportunities than the benchmark
firms.
We have reported that focusing firms invest significantly less than firms that do not focus .
This result is not affected by the divestiture since we look at investment the year before the
divestiture. The capital expenditures of the focusing firms are one-third lower than the capital
expenditures for the non-focusing firms. This is consistent with the argument that focusing firms
are financially constrained  relative to firms that do not focus. A probable cause for this is that
cash flow for focusing firms is substantially lower than for non-focusing firms.  Using medians,
the cash flow to sales ratio for focusing firms is more than a quarter less than the cash flow to
sales ratio for non-focusing firms. Thus, compared to non-focusing firms, focusing firms are more
likely to be financially constrained.
Comparing firms that focus by divesting non-core segments with firms that focus by
divesting core segments leads to a sharp contrast shown in Table 8. Firms that focus by divesting
non-core segments perform more poorly than firms that do not focus or firms that focus by
divesting core segments. In particular, the firms that divest non-core segments have significantly
lower median ratios of cash flow to sales and median capital expenditures to sales. In fact, the
firms that divest core segments seem to perform at least as well as the firms that do not focus.16
This suggests that the financing hypothesis seems much less applicable to the firms that divest
core segments.
Table 9 reports six logistic regressions that attempt to establish how these variables affect the
likelihood that a firm focuses. The first regression uses as explanatory  variables firm cash flow,
capital expenditures,  q and leverage. In this regression, all variables have significant coefficients.
Firms with higher cash flow and firms that invest more are less likely to be in our sample of
focusing firms. Also, firms with higher  q and less debt are more likely to focus. These results are
supportive of the financing hypothesis except for the coefficient on Tobin’s  q.  This coefficient
indicates that after controlling for cash flow and capital expenditures, firms with higher  q’s are
more likely to focus. In regression (2), we replace debt by the coverage ratio. It has a negative
coefficient as expected. In regression (3), we add the Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (1997)
diversity measure. This measure has no significant effect on the probability of focusing.
Regression (4) replaces the measure of diversity by the diversification discount. The
diversification discount does not have a significant coefficient either.  Regressions (5) and (6) add
growth measures to regression (1).  Only sales growth is significant in regression (5), while cash
flow is no longer significant. In regression (6), we remove cash flow growth. In this case, the
results are similar to those of regression (1) and neither sales growth  nor capital expenditures
growth are significant.
These regressions show that firms that have lower cash flow, coverage ratios and capital
expenditures are more likely to divest segments. In other words, performance seems crucial in
determining whether a firm is in our sample or not. This is fully consistent with the view that
firms focus because they face financial constraints and/or pressure from the market for corporate
control. Our main focus here has been on the degree to which firms are financially constrained, so
that we have ignored the extent to which the agency costs of managerial discretion that underpin
the financing hypothesis of divestitures vary across firms. We note, however, earlier work by
Denis, Denis and Sarin (1997), Berger and Ofek (1998) and  Palia (1998) shows that corporate
governance variables can affect a firm’s degree of diversification as well as its focusing decision.17
4. Abnormal returns and focusing models
In section 2, we saw that firms sell segments in a way that is inconsistent with the
portfolio model of focusing. In section 3, we saw that firms that focus  underinvest relative to
firms that do not, which is consistent with the financing hypothesis of focusing. In this section,
we examine the prediction of the financing hypothesis of focusing for the stock-price reaction to
the divestiture decision. 
With the financing hypothesis of focusing, the firm is willing to reduce its price to some
extent to sell the asset quickly. However, it will not sell below some reservation price. A
successful asset  divesture therefore means that the firm found a buyer willing to pay more than
the reservation price. An unsuccessful asset divestiture implies a fall in firm value since no buyer
was found. We have only data for successful divestitures, so that the abnormal return associated
with such sales should be positive on average as long as management puts the funds obtained to
good uses. Since firms prefer to divest non-core segments, a successful divestiture of a core
segment means that no purchaser was found for non-core segments; this is bad news about the
value of the firm's non-core segments. Hence, the abnormal return for non-core segment
divestitures is higher than the abnormal return for core segment divestitures. Similarly, a
successful divestiture that generates cash has a greater abnormal return than one that does not
because management prefers divestitures that generate cash.
A firm that is financially constrained benefits more from a divestiture for a given
reservation price. However, a financially constrained firm is likely to have a lower reservation
price – the fire sale effect  - which implies a lower abnormal return. A negative relation between
the abnormal return and a measure of the degree to which the firm is financially constrained
would indicate that the firm has a lower reservation price. Liquidity is more limited for larger
segments, which makes a divestiture of a larger segment more unexpected.  Further, selling larger
segments generates more resources for the firm. Both effects increase the abnormal return
associated with the divestiture for larger segments.18
From our search in LEXIS NEXIS for the 168 firms in the main sample, 105 firms have
an announcement date.
9 First consider the abnormal returns for the focusing announcements. The
results for days –5 to +5 are reported in Table 10 for the whole sample. To facilitate comparison
with earlier papers and to test the hypothesis of change in diversification strategy, we also divide
up the sample into divestitures of core segments and divestitures of non-core segments. It is
important to note that our announcement date is the first date that suggests a firm will divest one
or more segments. Despite the fact that we focus on segment divestitures and that our sample
includes both  spinoffs and assets sales, our results are similar to those of earlier studies. We find a
significant positive announcement return for the event day as well as for the three days
surrounding the event. Our three-day abnormal return (1.09 percent) is slightly less than that
found by John and Ofek (1995) (1.5 percent) in their study of asset sales. As in previous studies,
the positive announcement return is wholly due to the divestiture of segments outside the core of
the firm. In John and Ofek (1995), the dummy variable for a core divestiture indicates an
abnormal return difference between core and non-core divestitures of 2.38 percent. We find here
that the difference is 2.07 percent. For the core segments divested, we find a negative
insignificant abnormal return over a short event window and a negative significant abnormal
return over the (–5 ,+5) event window.
The evidence in Table 10 is consistent with the financing hypothesis. With the portfolio
model of focusing, firms do not have to sell assets to generate funds. This makes it hard to
explain the poor reaction to core asset sales. The most plausible explanation would be that firms
divest core assets which are overvalued in their current use by the market, so that a divestiture
indicates that the firm's other core assets are worth less in their current use. It is unclear, however,
why  divested core assets would be overvalued by the market in their current use, while divested
non-core assets would be systematically undervalued. Similarly, it is hard to square this evidence
with the inefficient internal capital markets model of focusing. With that model, firms divest
                                                   
9 While we have a maximum of 105 data points in the event-study analysis, only 62 observations can be
used when segment data is included in the analysis. This is a result of the consistent history requirement we
impose on the segment data (see section 2.2.2. for more details).19
assets when the internal capital market inefficiencies justify doing so. Presumably, if firms divest
core assets with that model, it is because doing so decreases internal capital market inefficiencies
more than divesting non-core assets, which makes it hard to understand why divestitures of core
assets would have a significantly lower stock-price reaction.
In Table 11 we use multivariate regressions to investigate whether the cross-sectional
distribution of abnormal returns is consistent with the prediction of the financing hypothesis.
Unfortunately, data requirements for our regressions make the sample substantially smaller. For
all regressions, the CARs and the accounting variables are trimmed at the 1 percent and 99
percent level and we use White-adjusted standard errors to compute the  p-values whenever
homoscedasticity is rejected.  For regression (1), we regress the abnormal returns on a dummy
variable that takes a value of one if the divestiture involves a non-core segment, a dummy
variable that takes a value of one if the divestiture generates cash, the logarithm of the firm's
sales, and the logarithm of the segment's sales. We find the expected significant positive
coefficient on segment size. The dummy variable for whether the divestiture involves a non-core
segment is also positive and significant. The dummy variable for divestitures that generate cash is
positive, but not significant. Whether a segment is a core segment or not explains about 1 percent
of the cross-sectional variation in abnormal returns. In contrast, regression (1) has an adjusted R-
square of 15.18 percent, indicating that the relative size of the segment has considerable
explanatory power. The median firm in our sample has a proportional decrease in debt to total
assets from the year before the segment divestiture to the year after. In regression (2), we use as
an additional explanatory variable the proportional change in debt to total assets from the year
before the segment divestiture to the year after. As in Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz (1994), firms that
decrease debt have higher abnormal returns. The coefficient on the proportional increase in debt
is significantly negative.
For regression (3), we investigate whether abnormal returns are related to a proxy for the
extent to which a firm is financially constrained. Because of our emphasis on the lower
investment of focusing firms, we choose as a proxy for the degree to which a firm is financially20
constrained the difference between a firm's investment and the investment of its benchmark firm.
We find that the less a firm invests relative to its industry, the lower the abnormal return
associated with the sale. We interpret this as evidence that firms that are more financially
constrained have a lower reservation price for assets.
In Section 2, we showed that segment characteristics affect which segment a firm divests.
Consequently, some segments are more likely to be divested than others , which affects the
market's reaction to the announcement of a divestiture. This means that adding segment
characteristics should allow us to explain more of the abnormal return. If this is the case, the
regressions without segment characteristics might be  misspecified. We investigate the impact on
abnormal returns of segment cash flow and segment investment in the next four regressions of
Table 12. Interestingly, as soon as we add these segment characteristics, divestitures that generate
cash have a significantly higher abnormal return as expected. In these four regressions, the only
added segment characteristic that is significant is the segment's cash flow. Surprisingly, the
abnormal return is higher when a segment with a higher cash flow is sold. We checked whether
this coefficient could be explained by  outliers, but this is clearly not the case. Based on the result
of Section 2, divestitures of high cash flow segments are unexpected. It may well be that, if such
segments are divested, they are divested at a much higher premium relative to their value within
the firm.  This could reflect greater growth opportunities that the financially constrained firms
could not exploit. Further work should investigate this issue further. It is clear from our
regressions that segment characteristics are an important determinant of the market's reaction to
the divestiture decision; they explain substantially more of the stock-price reaction to divestiture
announcements.
In regressions not reported in Table 11, we investigated whether the abnormal return is
related to variables that relate to the inefficiency of internal capital markets. In particular, we
know from Lang and Stulz (1994) that the impact of diversification on the diversification
discount is sharpest when a firm goes from one segment to two segments. This suggests that the
benefit from reducing the number of segments should be strongest when a firm goes from two21
segments to one. Nevertheless, a dummy variable that takes a value of one for firms with more
than two segments is insignificant when added to regression (1). We also added the following
variables individually to regression (1) the diversification discount, the firm's measure of
diversity of investment opportunities, the change in the firm's measure of diversity of investment
opportunities, and the segment's investment opportunities - measured by the segment's industry  q
- are all insignificant.  Thus, none of the variables one would associate with the internal capital
market inefficiencies hypothesis of focusing seem to have any impact on the abnormal return.
5. Conclusions
In spite of a substantial literature documenting the existence of a diversification discount and
a growing literature addressing the divestiture decision, we are still at the beginning stages of
understanding why and how firms focus. In this paper, we use segment level data to better
understand this decision. We find that focusing firms are much more likely to divest their smallest
segment than any other segment. The largest segment is extremely unlikely to be divested, even if
it is the  worst performing segment of the firm.
This greater probability of divestiture of the smallest segment is inconsistent with a simple
model of corporate focusing where firms divest segments that  underperform their industry.
Strikingly,  overinvestment is not an issue for focusing firms. In our sample, focusing firms invest
significantly less than firms that do not focus . Further, focusing firms are less profitable and are
growing less than firms with an equal number of segments that do not focus. We view this to be
consistent with the prediction of the financing hypothesis of focusing. That is, management
divests segments to relax financial constraints that prevent it from pursuing its objectives. It
would rather sell segments that have the least impact on its value to the firm, which in general
means that it would rather sell non-core segments. It is not enough, however, for a firm to want to
sell a segment. A successful sale also requires a buyer paying a reasonable price. As emphasized
by Shleifer and Vishny (1992), asset markets are illiquid and this  illiquidity grows with asset size.
This  illiquidity makes it harder for firms to divest large segments and can explain both why firms22
are more likely to divest small segments and why the abnormal return for sales of large segments
is higher than for sales of small segments.23
Appendix: Measures of Diversification
Throughout the paper we use various measures to capture the extent of firm diversification,
focusing, and excess value associated with diversification. The simplest measure uses the number
of segments and the change in the number of segments during the focusing year.  Other measures
are described in more detail below.
A.1. Berger and Ofek (1995) measure of the diversification discount
We follow the methodology of Berger and Ofek (1995) to calculate the firm’s diversification
discount due to its multi-segment character.  This measure is calculated as the percentage
difference between a firm’s total value and the sum of imputed values for its segments as stand-
alone entities.  From the Compustat Industry Segment (CIS) database, we collect all non-financial
(SIC codes outside the 6000-6999 range) single-segment firms during the 1979-94 period that
satisfy the following criteria.  The firm’s total sales, as reported by Compustat, must be within a
plus and minus one percent range of the total of the firm’s segment sales, as reported in the CIS
database.  The market value of common equity (Compustat data items 199 ·25), the book value of
debt (Compustat data items 5+34), the carrying value of preferred stock (Compustat item 130),
and sales (Compustat data item 12) need to be available from the Compustat database. Finally,
firm total sales must be at least $20 million.
Following Berger and Ofek (1995) we calculate the diversification discount
as ) ) ( ln( V I V DISCOUNT = , where [ ] ￿ = · =
n
i mf i i SALES V Ind SALES V I
1 ) ( ) ( , and
V = firm’s total capital (market value of equity plus book value of debt),
I( V) = imputed value of the sum of a firm’s segments as stand-alone firms,
SALESi = segment  i’s sales,
Indi( V/SALES) mf = ratio of the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of
debt over the firm’s total sales, for the median single-segment firm
in segment  i’s industry,
DISCOUNT = the firm’s discount due to diversification,
n = number of segments in segment  i’s firm.24
Values for the variable  DISCOUNT that are smaller (larger) than –1.386 (+1.386), are
considered outliers and hence eliminated from the sample.  Industry medians for the value of
Indi( V/SALES) mf  are based on 4-digit SIC codes and a minimum of five firms is required to
define an industry. Whenever the number of firms within an industry is less than five, we use the
broader 3-digit SIC codes, and, finally, if necessary, 2-digit SIC codes.
A.2. Change in the sales-based Herfindahl index
The sales-based Herfindahl index for firm  j in year  t,  
j
t H , is defined as
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where 
j
t H  (
j
t H 1 - ) is the Herfindahl index for firm  j in the year after (before) the decrease
segments.   The value for the Herfindahl is always in between 1 (completely focused) and 1/ n
(completely diversified).  Whereas an increase in the Herfindahl index is usually interpreted as an
increase in focus, a decrease in the number of segments does not necessarily have to coincide
with an increase in the Herfindahl index.
A.3. Change in the Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (1999) measure of diversification
  Rajan ,  Servaes , and  Zingales  (1999) use the coefficient of variation of the weighted segment’s
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subscript  i refers to segment  i of the diversified firm,  n to the total number of segments in the
diversified firm,  SALES to the segment sales,  q is the median level of  q for all Compustat firms in
the same 2-digit SIC code as the segment’s 2-digit SIC code, and  q  the sales-weighted average  q
across the  n segments of the diversified firm.
10
                                                   
10   Rajan,  Servaes, and  Zingales (1999) use asset-weighted  qs rather than sales-weighted  qs. While segment
sales reflect external sales only, and hence have a tendency to underreport the value of total sales,
Scharfstein (1997) on the other hand, argues that management has higher discretion in reporting assets than
sales, increasing the likelihood of introducing noise in the assets measures. Our results are qualitatively and
statistically robust to the use of either assets or sales in the  CVQ measure.25
For firms with three or more segments, we evaluate for each segment how the value of  CVQ
would change when this segment would have been divested.  In doing so, we can compare the
implicit change in the  CVQ measure between actually divested segments and retained segments.26
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Table 1
Sample Breakdown
Our sample consists of all firms identified by  Compustat’s Business Information file as reporting a
decrease in the number of segments over the period 1979-94. We exclude American Depository
Receipts and firms that have either a Compustat SIC or an Industry Segment Identification code
(SID) between 6000 and 6999 (Financial Services Industry), 4900 and 4999 (Regulated Utilities).
We also exclude firms smaller than $100 million in size and firms where we could not confirm,
via Lexis- Nexis, a transaction corresponding to the decrease in segments. Panel B presents the
number of firms in the sample with a decrease of one, two, or three segments, respectively.  Panel
C shows the frequency of firms with a given change in the sales-based Herfindahl index prior to
the focusing year and in the focusing year.
Panel A:  Number of focusing firms per year in final sample

















Total 168      100%
Panel B:  Decrease in Reported Segments





Panel C:  Changes in Herfindahl Index












Frequencies of Firm and Divested Segment Industry Classification
Panel A presents the frequency of firms in the sample by major industry grouping. In Panels B
and C cells represent frequencies of the overall firm-level industry classification (Rows) and the
spun-off segment’s industry classification by major industry grouping (Panel B) and a more
detailed breakdown for manufacturing firms (2-digit industry codes 20-39) (Panel C). Panel D (E)
shows the relatedness between the divested (non-divested) segments and the firm based on 2-, 3-
and 4-digit SIC codes.
Panel A:  Two-Digit Major Industry Distribution of Sample Firms
(2-digit SIC) Industry Title n %
(10-14) Mining 4 2.4
(20-39) Manufacturing 131 78.0
(40-49) Transportation, Communication,
Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Services 9 5.4
(50-51) Wholesale Trade 13 7.7
(52-59) Retail Trade 6 3.6
(70-89) Services 5 3.0
Total 168 100%30
Table 2 - continued
Frequencies of Firm and Divested Segment Industry Classification
Panel B:  Major Industry Group Classification
Spun-off Segment Industry Classification (2-digit SIC code range)
Firm Industry Classification (10-14) (15-17) (20-39) (40-49) (50-51) (52-59) (70-89) Total
(10-14) Mining (4) 0 1 0 0 0 0 5
(15-17) Construction 0 (0) 0 0 0 0 0 0
(20-39) Manufacturing 15 2 (124) 4 6 3 7 161
(40-49) Transportation,Communication,
Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Services
1 0 3 (4) 0 0 2 10
(50-51) Wholesale Trade 1 0 6 2 (7) 0 3 19
(52-59) Retail Trade 0 0 0 0 0 (6) 1 7
(70-89) Services 1 0 2 1 0 0 (2) 6
Total 22 2 136 11 13 9 15 208
Panel C:  Detailed Industry Classification for Manufacturing Firms
Spun-off Segment Industry Classification (2-digit SIC code range)
Firm
2-digit SIC 20 22-23 26-27 28-30 33 34 35 36 37 38
21,24-25,
32,39 Total
20 (4) 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 8
22-23 1 (1) 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 3
26-27 1 0 (7) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 10
28-31 1 0 0 (22) 2 0 1 1 1 6 3 37
33 0 0 0 2 (3) 1 1 1 1 0 0 9
34 0 0 0 1 0 (1) 0 0 1 1 2 6
35 0 1 2 0 2 1 (11) 1 0 5 1 24
36 0 0 0 3 1 0 2 (1) 0 0 0 7
37 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 0 (1) 0 0 5
38 0 0 1 2 0 1 0 1 0 (1) 0 6
21,24,25,32,39 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 (4) 9
Total 8 2 11 33 8 8 18 6 4 13 13 12431
Table 2 - continued
Frequencies of Firm and Divested Industry Classification
SIC code level of detail
Number of spun-off segments with same
(different) SIC classification as firm % (%)
Panel D:  Relatedness of divested segments and Firm Industry
4-digit 18  (190) 8.7  (91.3)
3-digit 24  (184) 11.5  (88.5)
2-digit 63  (145) 30.3  (69.7)
Panel E:  Relatedness of non-divested segments and Firm Industry
4-digit 110  (356) 23.6  (76.4)
3-digit 170  (296) 36.5  (63.5)
2-digit 213  (253) 54.3 (45.7)32
Table 3
Univariate Analysis for Industry-Adjusted Segment Performance
Means [medians] of the non-divested and divested firm segments for variable combinations at the segment level available from Compustat. Cash
flows are defined as operating profits plus depreciation and net capital expenditures as gross capital expenditures minus depreciation. Industry-
adjustments are based on the difference between the variable and the median value of all Compustat firms with the same 2-digit SIC code in the
fiscal year before the focusing.  The  t subscript refers to the year relative to the focusing year  t.  Ratios are truncated at minus and plus one, sales
and asset growth levels at zero and 200 percent, and cash flow and capital expenditures growth at minus and plus two hundred percent. Asset
and sales numbers are in $ millions. Statistical significance of the difference in means [medians] is denoted with *** ,**, and * for 1, 5 and 10
percent rejection levels respectively.










Cash Flow t-1  / Sales t-2 122        -0.0185 0.124 290        0.0344*** <0.001        -0.0529*** <0.001
      [-0.0187]** 0.034       [0.0267]*** <0.001       [-0.0454]*** <0.001
Net Cap.  Exp t-1  / Sales t-2 120        -0.0062 0.398 289        0.0037 0.505        -0.0099 0.281
      [-0.0242]*** <0.001       [-0.0165]*** <0.001       [-0.0076]*** 0.010
(Cap.  Exp t-1 /Cap.  Exp t-2 )-1 115        -0.1826*** <0.001 276        0.0112 0.755        -0.1938*** <0.001
      [-0.2466]*** <0.001       [-0.0822] 0.216       [-0.1644]** 0.022
ln (Sales) t-1 121        0.5536*** <0.001 290        1.2966*** <0.001        -0.7430*** <0.001
      [0.7067]*** <0.001       [1.2188]*** <0.001       [-0.5121]*** 0.002
(Sales t-1 /Sales t-2 )-1 121        -0.0883*** <0.001 289        -0.0190 0.108        -0.0694*** 0.002
      [-0.0576]*** <0.001       [-0.0223]*** 0.001       [-0.0352]** 0.01333
Table 4
Univariate Analysis for Divested versus Retained Segment Performance
Means ( medians) of the non-divested and divested firm segment’s performance measures at the
segment level available from Compustat. Cash flow is defined as operating profits plus depreciation,
net capital expenditures as gross capital expenditures minus depreciation.  Tsales denotes the
aggregated sales for the firm. Segment median industry  q is calculated as the book value of total
assets net of the book value of equity plus the market value of equity divided by the book value of
total assets of all Compustat firms with the same 2-digit SIC code in the fiscal year before the
focusing. The  DCoefficient of Variation in  q is denoted in percent change. The  t subscript refers to
the year relative to the focusing year  t.  Ratios are truncated at minus and plus one, growth variables
at -100 and +200 percent. Asset and sales numbers are in $ millions. Statistical significance of the








ln (Sales) t-1 4.486 5.532    -1.045*** 0.000
[4.621] [5.445]   [-0.824]*** 0.000
ln (Assets) t-1 4.098 5.100    -1.002*** 0.000
[4.240] [5.155]   [-0.915]*** 0.000
(Sales t-1  / Sales t-2 )-1 0.009 0.083    -0.074*** 0.007
[0.031] [0.057]   [-0.026]* 0.069
(Sales t-2    / Sales t-3 )-1 0.037 0.049    -0.012 0.688
[0.002] [0.038]   [-0.036] 0.316
(Sales t-1  /  Tsales t-2 )-1 0.136 0.304    -0.168*** 0.000
[0.097] [0.232]   [-0.135]*** 0.000
(Sales t-2    /  Tsales t-3 )-1 0.146 0.300    -0.154*** 0.000
[0.107] [0.233]   [-0.126]*** 0.000
((Sales/ Tsales) t-1 / (Sales/ Tsales) t-2 )-1 -0.051 0.017    -0.068*** 0.002
[-0.030 0.002]   [-0.032]** 0.025
((Sales/ Tsales) t-2 / (Sales/ Tsales) t-3 )-1 -0.002 0.004    -0.006 0.801
[-0.031 -0.008]   [-0.023] 0.28734
Table 4 – continued







Cash Flow t-1  / Sales t-2 0.088 0.139    -0.051*** 0.000
[0.072] [0.121]   [-0.049]*** 0.001
Cash Flow t-2  / Sales t-3 0.086 0.133    -0.047*** 0.006
[0.100] [0.128]   [-0.028]*** 0.007
Capital Expenditure Measures
Net Cap.  Exp t-1  / Sales t-2 0.062 0.064    -0.002 0.845
[0.028] [0.040]   [-0.012]** 0.018
Net Cap.  Exp t-2  / Sales t-3 0.068 0.068     0.000 0.989
[0.031] [0.040]   [-0.009]** 0.047
(Cap.  Exp t-1 /Cap.  Exp t-2 )-1 -0.069 0.118    -0.187*** 0.003
[-0.146] [0.019]   [-0.165]*** 0.009
(Cap.  Exp t-2 /Cap.  Exp t-3 )-1 0.153 0.089     0.064 0.407
[-0.012][-0.019]    [0.007] 0.670
Investment Opportunity Measures
Segment Median Industry  q 1.267 1.294    -0.027 0.457
[1.190] [1.269]   [-0.079] 0.150
Segment Median Industry  q
a 1.226 1.294    -0.068* 0.061
[1.157] [1.269]   [-0.112]** 0.046
Segment Median Industry  q
b 1.226 1.272    -0.046 0.291
[1.157] [1.187]   [-0.030] 0.308
DCoefficient of Variation in  q (percent) -0.158 -0.177     0.019 0.820
[-0.141][-0.107]   [-0.034] 0.324
a   For non-core divested segments versus all retained segments.
b   For non-core divested segments versus non-core retained segments.35
Table 5
Relative Ranking of Within Firm and Industry-Adjusted Performance of Divested Divisions
Cells denote the number of divested segments within a ranking for different performance (industry-adjusted performance in parentheses).  The
Number of Divisions denote the total number of divisions within a firm and the rank denotes the relative magnitude, from low to high, of
respectively the value of the divisions cash flow (operating profits plus depreciation) in the year prior to the divestiture ( -1) normalized by the
firm’s total sales in year ( -2), the natural log of the division’s sales in year ( -1), segments industry median  q, the net capital expenditures in year
( -1) normalized by the firm’s total sales in year ( -2), and the division’s growth of capital expenditures in year ( -1) relative to year ( -2). The final
row denotes the total number of divested segments,  n, for each firm. Ties are assigned to the higher rank.
Number of Divisions within a Firm
2 3 4 5 6 7
Rank Cash Flowt-1/Salest-2
1 (low) 8 (10) 17 (13) 14 (14) 5 (9) 3 (3) 1 (1)
2 6 (4) 7 (7) 9 (9) 8 (5) 9 (8) 2 (1)
3 6 (9) 8 (8) 4 (5) 1 (2) 0 (0)
4 6 (4) 3 (2) 3 (3) 1 (2)
5 3 (2) 1 (1) 0 (0)
6 0 (0) 0 (0)
7 (high) 0 (0)
ln(Sales)t-1
1 (low) 13 (11) 21 (15) 20 (16) 6 (5) 6 (7) 0 (0)
2 1 (3) 7 (10) 11 (10) 8 (5) 4 (1) 2 (0)
3 2 (4) 5 (6) 4 (2) 2 (1) 1 (1)
4 1 (3) 4 (6) 1 (3) 1 (2)
5 1 (4) 2 (4) 0 (0)
6 2 (1) 0 (1)
7 (high) 0 (0)
segment  q
1 (low) 8 . 13 . 14 . 3 . 4 . 0 .
2 6 . 5 . 6 . 7 . 5 . 0 .
3 7 . 10 . 5 . 2 . 2 .
4 4 . 4 . 4 . 1 .
5 5 . 1 . 1 .
6 0 . 0 .
7 (high) 0 .
n 14 31 37 24 17 436
Table 5 – continued
Relative Ranking of Within Firm and Industry-Adjusted Performance of Divested Divisions
Cells denote the number of divested segments within a ranking for different performance (industry-adjusted performance in parentheses).   The
Number of Divisions denote the total number of divisions within a firm and the rank denotes the relative magnitude, from low to high, of
respectively the value of the divisions cash flow (operating profits plus depreciation) in the year prior to the divestiture ( -1) normalized by the
firm’s total sales in year ( -2), the natural log of the division’s sales in year ( -1), segments industry median  q, the net capital expenditures in year
( -1) normalized by the firm’s total sales in year ( -2), and the division’s growth of capital expenditures in year ( -1) relative to year ( -2). The final
row denotes the total number of divested segment,  n, for each multi-segment firm. Ties are assigned to the higher rank.
Number of Divisions
2 3 4 5 6 7
Rank Cap. Expt-1/Total Salest-2
1 (low) 6 (9) 12 (12) 8 (10) 6 (6) 2 (5) 1 (1)
2 8 (5) 8 (7) 7 (9) 7 (5) 1 (3) 0 (1)
3 10 (9) 8 (8) 0 (8) 4 (3) 1 (1)
4 12 (7) 2 (2) 2 (3) 0 (0)
5 8 (2) 5 (3) 0 (0)
6 3 (0) 0 (1)
7 (high) 2 (0)
( Cap. Expt-1/Cap. Expt-2)-1
1 (low) 11 (8) 11 (13) 10 (14) 5 (6) 4 (5) 2 (1)
2 3 (6) 8 (4) 10 (6) 6 (3) 4 (3) 1 (0)
3 10 (8) 7 (8) 7 (6) 2 (2) 0 (1)
4 9 (5) 3 (4) 4 (4) 0 (0)
5 3 (4) 3 (2) 0 (1)
6 0 (0) 1 (1)
7 (high) 0 (0)
n 14 31 37 24 17 437
Table 6
Segment Logistic Regression Results
Logistic regressions with a binary dependent variable that takes on the value one for a divested segment and zero for a retained segment. Cells
denote respectively the coefficient,  p-value ( in italics) and the slope (defined as x ¶ ¶ ] E[ y , for the binary model  y( 0,1) = b b'x+ e, evaluated at the mean
of  x),  the pseudo-R
2
, and the value of  -2 times the log likelihood. Accounting numbers are based on Compustat segment data (CF is cash flow;
CPX is capital expenditures), and the numerator in the ratios is measured in year ( -1) and the denominator in year ( -2) relative to the event year.
The Non-Core Dummy takes on a value of one when the 2-digit segment SIC code is different from the 2-digit firm SIC code. The change in the
Coefficient of Variation in  q is measured for each segment, as an implicit relative change in the coefficient of variation in  q in year ( -1) for the
firm, and the firm minus the segment. Segment  q is the industry median value of  q of all Compustat firms with the same two-digit SIC code as the
segment in a particular year. Statistical significance is denoted with *** ,**, and * for 1, 5 and 10 percent rejection levels respectively.
Model Intercept CF/ Sales
Ind. Median
CF/ Sales CPX/ Sales
Ind. Median






Var. in  q (%) Segment  q
(1)  0.457* -2.718** -0.172 -5.666***




: 12.90% -2 log Likelihood: 58.927
(2)  0.447* -2.518** -0.212 -5.637***  0.060
 0.061  0.027  0.878 <0.001  0.732
-0.444 -0.037 -0.993  0.011
Pseudo-R
2
: 12.69% -2 log Likelihood: 56.874
(3)  0.189 -2.750**  0.014 -5.086***  0.536* -0.162
 0.770  0.018  0.992 <0.001  0.061  0.697
-0.477  0.002 -0.882  0.093 -0.028
Pseudo-R
2
: 13.79% -2 log Likelihood: 63.012
(4) -0.2309 -3.176***  0.337 -0.644  9.064 -4.983***  0.496* -0.231
 0.730  0.009  0.907  0.669  0.150 <0.001  0.086  0.576
-0.550  0.058 -0.111  1.569 -0.863  0.086 -0.040
Pseudo-R
2
: 14.44% -2 log Likelihood: 65.998
(5) -0.468 -2.963** -0.195 -0.665  8.816 -4.987***  0.516*  0.082
 0.297  0.016  0.946 0.657  0.161 <0.001  0.072  0.642
-0.516 -0.034 -0.116  1.535 -0.868  0.090  0.014
Pseudo-R
2
: 14.12% -2 log Likelihood: 63.28838
Table 7
Firm Performance
Sample means [medians] of firm performance variables and its benchmark value, where each
benchmark value is calculated as the mean value of the performance measure for a portfolio,
consisting of a minimum of five firms in the same year as the sample firm, the same number of
segments, not selling segments in the event year, and in the same annual sales  decile . Cash Flow
is defined as operating income before depreciation ( Depr). The firm’s  q is defined as the sum of
the book value of assets and the market value of equity net of the book value of equity over the
book value of assets. Debt is defined as long term debt plus debt in current liabilities and assets as
debt plus the market value of equity. The coverage ratio is defined as interest expense plus
income before extraordinary items divided by interest expense. The coefficient of variation in  q is
reported times hundred. The diversification discount is calculated as in Berger and Ofek (1995)
(see Appendix). Statistical significance ( p-values) of the mean (median) difference is based on a
two-sided paired sample  t-test ( Wilcoxon signed-rank-test) under the null hypothesis of mean
[median] difference of zero. Statistical significance is denoted with *** ,**, and * for 1, 5 and 10
percent rejection levels respectively.
Sample Benchmark Difference p-value n
(Assets t-1 /Assets t-2 )-1 0.097 0.117    -0.019 0.243 156
[0.074] [0.106]  [-0.048]*** 0.002
Cash Flow t-1 /Sales t-2 0.123 0.149    -0.026*** 0.000 156
[0.111] [0.151]  [-0.033]*** 0.000
Net Income t-1/Sales t-2 0.032 0.046    -0.014** 0.014 156
[0.038] [0.046]  [-0.008]*** 0.006
(Sales t-1 /Sales t-2 )-1 0.074 0.100    -0.026** 0.045 156
[0.066] [0.103]  [-0.033]** 0.014
Cap. Exp t-1 /Sales t-2 0.066 0.096    -0.030*** 0.000 154
[0.049] [0.085]  [-0.036]*** 0.000
(Cap. Exp t-1  /Cap. Exp t-2 )-1 0.134 0.168    -0.034 0.356 155
[0.100] [0.168]  [-0.060] 0.191
q 1.269 1.228     0.042 0.383 146
[1.100] [1.239]  [-0.123]* 0.070
Debt t-1 /Assets t-1 0.329 0.359    -0.030 0.105 149
[0.299] [0.351]  [-0.067]** 0.017
Coverage Ratio 3.867 10.927    -7.060 0.109 158
[2.935] [4.748]  [-2.239]*** 0.000
Coefficient of Variation in  q 83.407 85.713    -2.306 0.459 121
[81.147] [86.775]   [-3.022] 0.395
Diversification discount -0.212 -0.103    -0.109** 0.033 92
[-0.246] [-0.109]   [-0.137]** 0.02139
Table 8
Firm Performance for Core and Non-Core Segment Divestitures
Sample means [medians] of firm performance variables and its benchmark value for core and non-core divestitures sub-groups, where each
benchmark value is calculated as the mean value of the performance measure for a portfolio, consisting of a minimum of five firms in the same year
as the sample firm, the same number of segments, not selling segments in the event year, and in the same annual sales  decile . Core segment
divestitures refers to cases where all divested segments have identical 2-digit SIC codes as the firm’s 2-digit SIC code. Non-core segment
divestitures where at least one of the 2-digit SIC codes of the divested segments is different from the overall 2-digit firm SIC code. Cash Flow is
defined as operating income before depreciation ( Depr). The firm’s  q is defined as the sum of the book value of assets and the market value of equity
net of the book value of equity over the book value of assets. Debt is defined as long term debt plus debt in current liabilities and assets as debt plus
the market value of equity. The coverage ratio is defined as interest expense plus income before extraordinary items divided by interest expense. The
coefficient of variation in  q is reported times 100. Excess Value is calculated as in Berger and Ofek (1995) (see Appendix). Statistical significance
( p-values) of the mean (median) difference is denoted with *** ,**, and * for 1, 5 and 10 percent rejection levels respectively.
Non-Core Divestitures Core Divestitures Non-Core-Core
Variable n Sample Benchmark Difference p-value n Sample Benchmark Difference p-value Difference p-value
(1) (2) (1 -2) (1 -2) (3) (4) (3 -4) (3 -4) (1 -3) (1 -3)
(Assets t-1 /Assets t-2 )-1 125 0.095 0.117  -0.022 0.249 31 0.108 0.114  -0.007 0.814  -0.013 0.698
[0.074] [0.109] [-0.060]*** 0.001 [0.076] [0.101] [-0.029]0.565 [-0.002] 0.842
Cash Flow t-1 /Sales t-2 125 0.112 0.148  -0.036*** 0.000 31 0.166 0.154   0.012 0.536  -0.053*** 0.010
[0.108] [0.151] [-0.036]*** 0.000 [0.154] [0.150] [-0.006]0.954 [-0.046]*** 0.009
Net Income t-1/Sales t-2 125 0.029 0.047  -0.018*** 0.005 31 0.042 0.043   0.000 0.986  -0.013 0.366
[0.036] [0.047] [-0.013]*** 0.001 [0.052] [0.043]  [0.007]0.565 [-0.017]** 0.028
(Cash Flow t-1 /Cash Flow t-2 )-1 119 0.228 0.120   0.108 0.438 30 -0.012 0.135  -0.147*** 0.009   0.240 0.108
[0.060] [0.136] [-0.055]** 0.030 [0.050] [0.121] [-0.080]** 0.011  [0.010] 0.967
(Sales t-1 /Sales t-2 )-1 125 0.064 0.097  -0.033** 0.024 31 0.115 0.114   0.002 0.947  -0.051* 0.093
[0.060] [0.103] [-0.033]** 0.018 [0.087] [0.099] [-0.030]0.408 [-0.027] 0.162
Cap. Exp t-1 /Sales t-2 123 0.063 0.091  -0.028*** 0.000 31 0.079 0.114  -0.036 0.139  -0.016 0.247
[0.047] [0.083] [-0.037]*** 0.000 [0.062] [0.090] [-0.031]** 0.046 [-0.015] 0.16140
Table 8 – continued
Firm Performance for Core and Non-Core Segment Divestitures
Sample means [medians] of firm performance variables and its benchmark value for core and non-core divestitures sub-groups, where each
benchmark value is calculated as the mean value of the performance measure for a portfolio, consisting of a minimum of five firms in the same year
as the sample firm, the same number of segments, not selling segments in the event year, and in the same annual sales  decile . Core segment
divestitures refers to cases where all divested segments have identical 2-digit SIC codes as the firm’s 2-digit SIC code. Non-core segment
divestitures where at least one of the 2-digit SIC codes of the divested segments is different from the overall 2-digit firm SIC code. Cash Flow is
defined as operating income before depreciation ( Depr). The firm’s  q is defined as the sum of the book value of assets and the market value of equity
net of the book value of equity over the book value of assets. Debt is defined as long term debt plus debt in current liabilities and assets as debt plus
the market value of equity. The coverage ratio is defined as interest expense plus income before extraordinary items divided by interest expense. The
coefficient of variation in  q is reported times 100. Excess Value is calculated as in Berger and Ofek (1995) (see Appendix). Statistical significance
( p-values) of the mean (median) difference is denoted with *** ,**, and * for 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent rejection levels respectively.
Non-Core Divestitures Core Divestitures Non-Core-Core
Variable n Sample Benchmark Difference p-value n Sample Benchmark Difference p-value Difference p-value
(1) (2) (1-2) (1-2) (3) (4) (3-4) (3-4) (1-3) (1-3)
(Cap. Exp t-1  /Cap. Exp t-2 )-1 124 0.093 0.165  -0.071* 0.083 31 0.296 0.181   0.115 0.158  -0.203** 0.034
[0.061] [0.190] [-0.085]*0.053 [0.213] [0.136] [-0.036]0.355  [-0.152] 0.150
ln (Sales) t-1 127 6.828 6.937  -0.109*** 0.003 31 6.799 6.672   0.127 0.180   0.028 0.918
[6.868] [6.664] [-0.079]** 0.014 [6.306] [6.516]  [0.056]0.316  [0.562]* 0.072
q 118 1.204 1.219  -0.015 0.714 28 1.547 1.262   0.286 0.104  -0.343*0.072
[1.089] [1.236] [-0.129]** 0.015 [1.249] [1.270]  [0.010]0.372 [-0.161]0.402
Debt t-1 /Assets t-1 126 0.270 0.272  -0.002 0.882 31 0.235 0.289  -0.054*0.081   0.034 0.316
[0.241] [0.274] [-0.017] 0.207 [0.220] [0.286] [-0.091]** 0.020  [0.021]0.337
Coverage Ratio 127 3.389 12.170 -8.781 0.109 31 5.823 5.836  -0.012 0.992  -2.434** 0.048
[2.801] [4.912] [-2.556]*** 0.000 [4.170] [4.242] [-1.285]0.592 [-1.368]0.318
Coefficient of Variation in  q 99 85.253 86.221 -0.968 0.783 22 75.099 83.427 -8.328 0.215  10.154 0.207
[81.147] [86.775] [-3.022] 0.647 [82.335] [84.849] [-2.261]0.302  [-1.188] 0.966
Excess Value 73 -0.258 -0.114  -0.144** 0.012 19 -0.036 -0.061   0.025 0.828  -0.222*0.059
[-0.285] [-0.119] [-0.205]** 0.011 [-0.109] [-0.056] [-0.010]0.953 [-0.176]* 0.07341
Table 9
Firm Logistic Regression Results
Logistic regressions with a binary dependent variable that takes on the value one for a divested segment and zero for a retained segment. Cells
denote respectively the coefficient,  p-value and the slope (defined as x ¶ ¶ ] E[ y , for the binary model  y( 0,1) =b b'x+ e, evaluated at the mean of  x), the
pseudo-R
2
, and the value of  -2 times the log likelihood. Cash Flow is defined as operating income before depreciation ( Depr). The firm’s  q is
defined as the sum of the book value of assets and the market value of equity net of the book value of equity over the book value of assets. Debt is
defined as long term debt plus debt in current liabilities and assets as debt plus the market value of equity. The coverage ratio is defined as
interest expense plus income before extraordinary items divided by interest expense. The coefficient of variation in  q is reported times 100.
Excess Value is calculated as in Berger and Ofek (1995) (see Appendix). Accounting numbers are based on the firm-level data, and the numerator
in the ratios is measured in year ( -1) and the denominator in year ( -2). Statistical significance is denoted with *** ,**, and * for 1, 5 and 10

























(1)  1.592*** -10.396***   -5.902*    0.875**   -3.045**
 0.009   0.001    0.061    0.028    0.023
 -2.599   -1.475    0.219   -0.761
Pseudo-R
2: 8.63% -2 log Likelihood: 34.234
(2)    0.617    -7.772**   -6.528**   1.101***   -0.078**
0.167    0.017    0.042    0.005    0.017
   -1.928   -1.620    0.273   -0.019
Pseudo-R
2: 9.67% -2 log Likelihood: 38.604
(3)    1.180    2.415-18.253***    0.280   -1.475   -0.001
0.185    0.597    0.003    0.603    0.312    0.848
   0.602  -4.549    0.070   -0.368    0.000
Pseudo-R
2: 7.27% -2 log Likelihood: 21.75742
Table 9 - continued
Firm Logistic Regression Results
Logistic regressions with a binary dependent variable that takes on the value one for a divested segment and zero for a retained segment. Cells
denote respectively the coefficient,  p-value, and the slope (defined as x ¶ ¶ ] E[ y , for the binary model  y( 0,1) =b b’x+ e, evaluated at the mean of  x),
the pseudo-R
2
, and the value of  -2 times the log likelihood. Cash Flow is defined as operating income before depreciation ( Depr). The firm’s  q is
defined as the sum of the book value of assets and the market value of equity net of the book value of equity over the book value of assets. Debt is
defined as long term debt plus debt in current liabilities and assets as debt plus the market value of equity. The coverage ratio is defined as
interest expense plus income before extraordinary items divided by interest expense. The coefficient of variation in  q is reported times 100.
Excess Value is calculated as in Berger and Ofek (1995) (see Appendix). Accounting numbers are based on the firm-level data, and the numerator
in the ratios is measured in year ( -1) and the denominator in year ( -2). Statistical significance is denoted with *** ,**, and * for 1, 5 and 10





















(4)    1.729*    1.511 -26.231***    0.271   -1.560   -0.681
   0.090    0.777   0.000   0.603    0.429   0.253
   0.375   -6.515    0.067    -0.387   -0.169
Pseudo-R
2
: 14.67% -2 log Likelihood: 35.384
(5)   1.748***   -5.524 -11.138**    0.665   -3.331**   -2.734*    0.259    0.758
  0.006    0.183   0.020    0.121    0.019    0.076    0.157    0.123
  -1.380  -2.782    0.166   -0.832   -0.683    0.065    0.189
Pseudo-R
2
: 10.27% -2 log Likelihood: 39.280
(6)   1.590***  -9.978***   -7.425**    0.871**   -2.828**  -0.950   0.635
 0.010   0.004    0.030   0.032    0.037   0.473   0.181
 -2.494  -1.856   0.218  -0.707  -0.237   0.159
Pseudo-R
2
: 9.16% -2 log Likelihood: 30.18543
Table 10
Market-adjusted Announcement Returns
The market-adjusted abnormal return (AR) is calculated using the CRSP equally weighted index as the benchmark return starting five days
before the announcement day to five days after the announcement day and cumulated for the periods ( -1 ,+1) and ( -5,+5). The sample consists
of all firms in the sample where Lexis  Nexis reports an announcement day for a specific focusing event. Core segment refers to cases where all
divested segments have identical 2-digit SIC codes as the firm’s 2-digit SIC code. Non-core segments refers to cases where at least one of the
2-digit SIC codes of the divested segments is different from the overall 2-digit firm SIC code. Statistical significance of the difference of the
abnormal returns and the difference in means is denoted with *** ,**, and * for 1, 5 and 10 percent rejection levels respectively.
All Firms ( n=105) Core Segments ( n=21) Non-Core segments ( n=84) Difference (Core-Non-Core)
Day AR (%) p-value AR (%) p-value AR (%) p-value AR (%) p-value
        -5     -0.011 0.954      0.736* 0.054     -0.189 0.385      0.924* 0.055
        -4      0.018 0.924      0.122 0.797     -0.007 0.971      0.1290.783
        -3      0.006 0.968     -0.411 0.069      0.105 0.569      -0.516* 0.073
        -2      0.173 0.469     -0.366 0.175      0.301 0.297      -0.667* 0.089
        -1      0.352 0.163     -0.020 0.976      0.440 0.110     -0.460 0.472
         0      0.605* 0.077     -0.421 0.231      0.789** 0.034     -1.210** 0.018
       +1      0.192 0.510     -0.153 0.725      0.269 0.434     -0.423 0.446
       +2      0.070 0.811     -0.003 0.994      0.087 0.804     -0.090 0.866
       +3     -0.319 0.167     -0.657 0.136     -0.239 0.370     -0.417 0.478
       +4     -0.066 0.781     -0.219 0.633     -0.030 0.912     -0.188 0.756
       +5      0.178 0.391      0.026 0.898      0.213 0.397     -0.188 0.556
   (-1,+1)      1.090** 0.015     -0.586 0.453      1.484*** 0.004     -2.070* 0.065
   (-5,+5)      1.136 0.131     -1.358* 0.077      1.723* 0.058     -3.081*** 0.00944
Table 11
Cross-sectional Regressions of (-1,+1) Cumulative Abnormal Returns
For each cross-sectional regression model, with ( -1 ,+1) cumulative abnormal returns, the table
reports the coefficients, the White (1981)  heteroscedasticity consistent  p-values (in  italics), the
number of observations ( n) and the adjusted R-squared  R
2. The Non-Core is a dummy variable
that takes on a value of one when the 2-digit segment SIC code is different from the 2-digit firm
SIC code. Firm Sales and Segment Sales are denoted as the natural logarithm of these variables.
Firm  q is defined as the sum of the book value of assets and the market value of equity net of the
book value of equity over the book value of assets. The change debt denotes the percentage
change in the debt-to-assets ratio in the period starting one year before to one year after the event.
Cash Flow (CF) is defined as operating income before depreciation normalized by year ( -1) sales
and CPX is capital expenditures normalized by year ( -1) sales. Excess Firm CPX/Sales is defined
as the firm's CPX minus  the  mean CPX of a portfolio of benchmark firms, based on size, number
of segments, and non-focusing. Industry-adjustments of segment cash flow (ICF) and capital
expenditures (ICPX) are based on subtracting the median value of all Compustat firms in the
same 2-digit SIC code within a year from the sample observation. Cash Event is a dummy
variable that takes on a value of one if the focusing event is associated with a cash inflow for the
parent firm ( e.g., asset sales) and zero for events that do not generate a cash inflow for the parent
firm ( e.g.,  spinoffs). Statistical significance is denoted with ***, **, and * for 1, 5 and 10 percent
rejection levels respectively.
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) Model (7)
Intercept   0.057**   0.044 0.044**   0.053  0.058*   0.062**   0.059**
  0.047    0.132    0.139    0.061    0.061   0.028   0.043
Non-Core   0.020*   0.022*   0.027**   0.029**   0.027**  0.030***   0.028**
  0.083    0.068    0.028    0.005    0.028   0.004   0.023
Firm Sales -0.019***  -0.016**  -0.016**  -0.024** -0.023*** -0.022*** -0.022***
  0.002    0.012    0.013    0.001    0.001   0.002  0.001
Segment Sales   0.012**   0.011*   0.010**   0.012**   0.014**   0.011*   0.008
  0.030    0.051    0.082    0.043    0.019   0.075   0.911
Change in debt/assets  -0.010*
  0.091
Excess Firm CPX/Sales  0.070*  0.044  0.000 0.075* 0.008
 0.056   0.147   0.998  0.081  0.911
Segment CF/Sales  0.131**
 0.017
Segment CPX/Sales    0.121
   0.155
Segment ICF/Sales   0.098*
   0.081
Segment ICPX/Sales   0.124
  0.258
Cash Event   0.012  0.009  0.012 0.028***  0.020***  0.026***   0.022*
  0.262    0.407    0.273   0.001   0.078  0.002   0.064
 
R
2   (%) 15.18 15.22 15.06 37.60 20.49 35.43 19.39
 n 64 60 58 53 60 53 60